

PART 3

MT

TOP SECRET

Confidential filing

UK/Soviet Relations

SOVIET
UNION

PE 1: MAY 1979

PE 3: JUNE 1984

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
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8.6.84		20.12.84					
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MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN: GORBACHEV

I spent about five hours with Gorbachev last Sunday. He gives the impression of confidence and authority. He is relatively open in manner and intelligent. He is affable and has some charm and humour. He listens carefully to what the other person says. He talks readily and, in contrast to the stultified manner of Soviet leaders, does not just stick to prepared statements. He picks up points made in discussion and responds to them. He was clearly not used to the sort of rigorous questioning which he got from me on things like human rights in the Soviet Union and Soviet payments to our mine-workers' union. But he kept cool and avoided the usual Soviet reaction of reciting lengthy positions of principle. He went to great pains to invoke Chernenko's name frequently in discussion as a source of authority for his remarks. I certainly found him a man one could do business with. I actually rather liked him - there is no doubt that he is completely loyal to the Soviet system but he is prepared to listen and have a genuine dialogue and make up his own mind.

I got the impression that in some ways he was using me as a stalking horse for you. He questioned me very closely on American motives and intentions for the Geneva talks and was clearly interested to obtain a first hand and informed impression of you and your main colleagues and of your policies. At the same time, he was on the look-out for possible divergences of view between us which might be exploited to Soviet advantage. I made it absolutely clear to him that we are loyal members of the Alliance and right behind you.

On the substance of my talks with him - and those which Geoffrey Howe had the following day - the most striking point was the amount of time devoted to the threat of an arms race in outer space. His line was that if you go ahead with the SDI, the Russians would either have to develop their own or, more probably, develop nuclear weapons that would get past your SDI defences. He made much of the role of the ABM treaty as the key stone to arms control negotiations and said that if events proceeded to the point where the ABM treaty was irrevocably undermined, the prospect of any further agreements thereafter would be minimal.

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TO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2520 OF 19 DEC

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY (PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY)
FROM BARCLAY (NO 10)

GORBACHEV VISIT

1. YOU SHOULD BE AWARE OF A CURIOUS EPISODE INVOLVING MR GORBACHEV.
2. SHORTLY AFTER 1700 LOCAL TIME TODAY (WEDNESDAY), GORBACHEV PLUS PARTY WERE PASSING DOWN WHITEHALL BY CAR FROM THE HOUSE OF COMMONS TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY. GORBACHEV HAD BEEN MEETING DAVID STEEL AND OTHERS. APPARENTLY, AS HE PASSED DOWNING STREET, HE EXPRESSED A WISH TO SEE THE OUTSIDE OF NO 10.
3. THE ACCOMPANYING SPECIAL BRANCH OFFICER NEGOTIATED ACCESS TO THE STREET DIRECT WITH THE POLICEMAN AT THE BARRIER (WITHOUT INFORMING US) AND GORBACHEV AND PARTY WALKED UP. THEY WERE ADMITTED BY THE POLICEMAN ON THE DOOR TO THE FRONT HALL (ONLY). THEY HAD GONE BEFORE ANY PRIVATE SECRETARY REACHED THE SPOT - REPORTEDLY IN GOOD HUMOUR.
4. SO FAR AS WE KNOW THERE WERE NO PHOTOGRAPHERS AND NO PRESS.
5. WE HAVE CONSIDERED WHETHER, SAY, MR THATCHER MIGHT BE ASKED TO INVITE GORBACHEV TO MAKE A PROPER TOUR OF THE STATE ROOMS, IF THE PRIME MINISTER AGREED. BUT FCO ADVICE IS RATHER AGAINST: HE LEAVES LONDON FOR SCOTLAND EARLY ON FRIDAY, AND WAS PROBABLY NOT SHOWING MORE THAN A 'PASSING INTEREST'.

A: ESTC PM'S PARTY
D NIL
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M S GORBACHEV - A BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Summary

I. Early years; 1931-1949

Gorbachev was born in 1931 into a peasant family in the agricultural area of Stavropol (North Caucasus), which was occupied by the Germans between August 1942 and January 1943. After working as an assistant to a combine harvester operator (probably part-time while he did his secondary education), Gorbachev entered Moscow University (paragraphs 1 to 4).

II. Moscow University, 1950-1955

Gorbachev studied law, but Moscow University was of decisive importance in his political career. He joined the Party in 1952 and was probably secretary of the University's Komsomol (the Party's youth wing) organisation (paragraphs 5 to 6).

III. Komsomol Work in Stavropol, 1956-1962

Immediately after university Gorbachev started his career as a Komsomol and Party official in his home region (paragraph 7).

IV. Party Work in Stavropol, 1962-1970

Gorbachev's first years as a Party official coincided with Khrushchev's last. He benefited from Khrushchev's numerous reorganisations of the Party apparatus, but also took a hand in returning the local Party organisation to its traditional form under Brezhnev (paragraph 8). He got an agricultural degree by correspondence (paragraph 9). He rose steadily in the Stavropol Party organisation, probably helped by the promotion to the centre of his former boss, Kulakov, and by the decline under Brezhnev of his immediate superior in the Stavropol regional party organisation (paragraphs 10 to 12).

V. First Secretary of Stavropol Kraikom, 1970-1978

On election as First Secretary of the Stavropol Kraikom in 1970, Gorbachev became one of the regional Party Secretaries who are the backbone of the Party's control over the country as a whole (paragraph 13). Locally he supported schemes to improve incentives for farm workers and greater mechanisation of the harvesting process. Nationally, he became a Deputy to the Supreme Soviet and a

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member of the Party's Central Committee. As such he began to lead Party delegations abroad (paragraphs 14 to 15).

VI. To Moscow as Central Committee Secretary, 1978

Gorbachev's crucial promotion to Party Secretary for Agriculture in 1978 probably came about through a mixture of luck (the sudden death of Kulakov), connections with the leadership (Suslov's interest in the region, and its resorts, frequented by the leadership) and ability (noted by Brezhnev). (Paragraphs 16 to 18.)

VII. Rise in the leadership under Brezhnev and Andropov, 1978-1984

At 47, Gorbachev was not exceptionally young to be made a Party Secretary, but his rise to full membership of the Politburo by 1980 was exceptionally rapid and was probably due in particular to Brezhnev's approval (paragraphs 19 to 20). Gorbachev's personal contribution to agricultural policies is hard to discern: this is probably to his advantage (paragraph 21). He rose steadily up the ranks of the Party Secretaries until he stood third after Andropov and Chernenko. With both sick in 1983, much of the burden of running Party affairs must have fallen on Gorbachev (paragraphs 22 to 23). In May 1983 he visited the West for the first time as a representative of the Soviet State (paragraph 24).

VIII. Under Chernenko as General Secretary, 1984

Gorbachev is unlikely to have challenged Chernenko for the leadership when Andropov died in February 1984. He retains the confidence of the rest of the leadership, as shown by the exceptional breadth of his current responsibilities as a Party Secretary: he supervises ideology and foreign policy, agriculture and general economic questions, and Party organisation. He is the natural choice as General Secretary when Chernenko dies, if his age (53) is not held against him (paragraphs 25 to 27).

IX. Personality, Family

Gorbachev is intelligent and urbane; nor is his wife a Soviet stereotype (paragraph 28).

X Conclusions

Gorbachev has had a successful Party career, a prerequisite for the highest political office, and one that is less narrow than it appears at first sight (paragraph 29). As the first Politburo member not old enough to have fought in the War or to have held political office under Stalin, and the first in recent history to have had a university education, Gorbachev belongs to a new generation. The generational gap should not be exaggerated:

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Gorbachev has made his entire career in the Party apparatus, whose discipline and suspicion of individualism have not been relaxed. But he reached political maturity under Brezhnev, when the Party came to recognise the complexity of the issues it was dealing with, sought specialist advice and strove for solutions that satisfied all interests. Gorbachev has thrived in this atmosphere (paragraph 30). Gorbachev himself probably holds progressive views on economic management, but would have no interest in a radical dilution of Party control. If he were to become the Soviet leader he would be subject to the same constraints as his predecessors, though his youth would of itself affect the style of leadership. On external affairs he has so far reflected the Party line (paragraph 31).

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NATIONAL STRATEGY INFORMATION CENTER

SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES V. THE FREE PRESS

A European Perspective

Address by

Sir James Goldsmith

**Publisher of *L'Express* Newsmagazine
Paris**

to the

Defense Strategy Forum

of the National Strategy Information Center

in cooperation with

**National Security Studies Program of
Georgetown University**

**Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies,
George Washington University**

**Washington, D.C.
May 22, 1984**

Freedom of the press is fundamental to the protection of the citizen against the power of the State. It is a prerequisite to liberty. Unconditionally we must fight for it.

But how should we react when allies of a totalitarian system try to use the freedom of our press as a protective screen behind which they can conspire to destroy freedom itself? Is the remedy to inhibit freedom of expression? No. The contrary is the case. The remedy is more investigation, more information and more publication of the truth. And for each of us in our own way to draw attention to the facts. That is my purpose today.

There are lessons to be learned from the conflict between Carthage and Rome. The Carthaginians were a great semitic people. When they needed to, they knew how to fight. Their greatest general, Hannibal, led his troops to victory in battles against Rome. But the Carthaginians were a mercantile civilisation. They were traders and merchants and they interpreted the motives of the Romans, according to mercantile logic. Rome was different. Rome's purpose was military conquest and imperial expansion. This, the Carthaginians were never able to understand and so ultimately Carthage was destroyed.

Today in the West we are like Carthage and Moscow like Rome. We seem incapable of understanding Moscow's way of thinking. We are mercantile and want to conduct our affairs in peace. We try to set our policies on the premise that the Soviets want to do the same. Everytime the Soviets embark on a new "peace" offensive, too many of us are pitifully eager to forget that this is no more than a modulation of Soviet tactics, not a change in their fundamental strategy.

Yet this should not be difficult for us to perceive. The 1977 Brezhnev constitution states quite officially that it is Soviet Russia's aim, indeed duty, to spread the Communist system to all countries of the world without exception. The Brezhnev Doctrine holds that once Communism is established in a country, it becomes irreversible. The U.S.S.R. would use military means to intervene in any country where Communist rule is threatened. On the other hand, Communist rule must be established in non-Communist countries. To achieve this, the Soviet Union would support "wars of national liberation" by harnessing genuine local revolutionary forces and guiding them to Marxist/Leninism. The Brezhnev Doctrine means that the movement can only go one way.

Nonetheless, many of us still want to believe that the problems that separate us are problems that can be resolved by negotiation and mutual goodwill. But unfortunately we must realise that we cannot find lasting peace through negotiation because what the Soviets really want we cannot negotiate. We cannot cede to them the right to progressive imperial conquest. We cannot negotiate away our freedom. We must face the fact that the antagonism between our two civilisations is not superficial but fundamental and that we are condemned to this state of affairs for the long term. There is no easy solution, no quick fix. The only way to peace is by doing whatever is necessary for both sides to realise that war cannot be won.

As a result of the West's defensive power, the Soviets recognise that their most effective current strategy is not armed conflict but instead to weaken us from within.

If they can make us lose our confidence, confuse our sense of purpose, weaken our resolve to defend ourselves, then they can win without armed conflict.

That has been their strategy in Europe. Their plan is clear:

- obtain overwhelming military, including nuclear, superiority so as to be able to exercise political blackmail.
- attempt to separate the USA and Europe and thereby encourage the withdrawal of US troops from Europe. This would eliminate automatic US involvement in a European war and isolate Europe.
- achieve substantial political power in each European country either through local Communist parties, or by infiltrating local socialist parties.
- penetrate and if possible dominate the key centres of power and more particularly the Trade Unions, the media, the Civil Service, etc.

If this can be accomplished, Europe would fall like a rotten fruit.

Their methods have been equally clear. Politically they have established Communist parties in each country. In Italy, France, Greece and Portugal, for example, these have grown to a substantial size, gaining between 12% and 30% of the vote. But whenever candidates, standing under the Communist party label, are unable to succeed at the ballot box, they switch labels and adopt the camouflage of Socialism. They penetrate local Socialist parties.

Recently in Great Britain, the Cabinet papers for Clement Attlee's period in office as Prime-Minister were declassified. They show that Attlee, a moderate Socialist leader, understood and stated clearly, as early as 1950, that as a result of the lack of electoral support, the Communist Party of the UK had changed its strategy from trying to obtain parliamentary representation to infiltrating the Socialist Party and other centres of power.

At the same time the Soviets, through skillful and coordinated use of their political allies and agents of influence, have worked to mould public opinion. Their major propaganda thrusts have been to encourage:—

- unilateral disarmament
- neutralism
- increased trade with the Soviet bloc
- anti-Americanism

Anti-Americanism has a double benefit for the Soviets. Its impact in Europe is obvious. But also it encourages isolationism in America. If anti-American demonstrations are orchestrated every time a high profile American official visits Europe, and if the U.S. media give suitable prominence to the demonstrations, then resentment and isolationism are encouraged among Americans. Of course there will always be some anti-Americanism and some xenophobia just as there is always some temptation to seek peace by unilateral disarmament. The object of Soviet measures is to use these naturally occurring sentiments and to distort them, exaggerate them and manipulate them so as to serve Soviet purposes. One of their principal tools is propaganda. So they need the media.

Andrei Sakharov, the Nobel Prize winner, smuggled out of Russia what he called his testament to the West. In it he described agents of influence working in the West for Soviet agencies. He wrote “these include some political figures, businessmen and a great many writers and journalists, Government advisers and heads of press and T.V.”

Also we have the testimony of a number of defectors who have held key positions in Soviet bloc intelligence. Men like Ladislav Bittman who was Deputy Chief of the Disinformation Department (Department Eight) of the Czech Intelligence Service. He spent eight years

abroad directing and recruiting spies under the control of the KGB. And Stanislav Levchenko who worked as a journalist on the New Times but, in fact, was an important member of the KGB assigned to Tokyo with responsibilities for penetrating the Japanese media. There are many others.

Each one of these men has testified to the importance of recruiting journalists as their agents. Let me quote some extracts from Bittman's testimony. Bittman stated that he "focused on political figures and journalists". "The primary responsibility of these journalists was to publish articles and stories, but their pieces did not emphasize support for Soviet policy. Rather, the major focus concentrated on undermining the United States and NATO, and on creating rifts between West Germany and France or between the United States and its allies."

"I provided guidelines for the agents to follow. These consisted of a two or three page outline of objectives and themes to be covered. . . ."

"A relatively high percentage of secret agents are journalists. A journalist operating in Great Britain, West Germany or the United States is a great asset to Communist Intelligence. He can be investigative, professionally curious, it is his job to get important and even highly sensitive information."

"There are many journalists who are agents. There are important newspapers around the world penetrated by Communist Intelligence Services. There are one or two journalists working for a particular paper and who are agents and who receive from time to time instructions to publish this story or that story. . . ."

Levchenko has stated:—

"In my own case, the most important influence agents I directed were journalists."

"A KGB officer generally focuses on recruiting two kinds of journalists. One type is the specialist in a particular subject area who possesses both sensitive information and connections with key individuals. . . . The second type of desired journalist is the individual with a wide following, or one associated with a newspaper with a wide distribution."

"In general you provide guidelines, themes and objectives. You make suggestions and discuss how the agent might implement and accomplish the objective."

These intelligence officials backed up their statements by supplying the names of those whom they had employed as agents of influence. Recently, there have been further defectors from Soviet Intelligence who were closely connected with the Soviet propaganda apparatus. They have confirmed the testimony of Bittman and Levchenko and have provided substantial further information.

Sometimes an apparently independent newspaper publishes with regularity articles which must cast doubt on the publication's claimed independence. Such a newspaper is *Ethnos*, Greece's largest daily tabloid.

Here are some examples of its reportings:

- On Poland:—Solidarity is a union working for the CIA and the Vatican which receives funds from the Mafia. The Pope's historical visit to Poland from 16th June to 23rd June 1983 was not reported.
- Afghanistan:—Afghanistan's resistants are described as a group of bandits whose crimes are similar to those of the Nazis. According to *Ethnos* there is no Afghan problem. It was artificially created to serve U.S. strategy.
- The Berlin Wall:—*Ethnos* describes this as the wall of peace which was built to prevent a

planned Western attack against East Germany.

- Soviet Russia:—is described as the world's leading peace loving country.
- The United States:—according to Ethnos, Reagan, with the FBI, have muzzled the American people; political liberty in the United States has never been under greater threat; the country is plunging into totalitarianism.
- The Korean Airlines Jumbo Jet:—according to Ethnos the incident was a deliberate provocation by the CIA to spy on Soviet Russia.
- Grenada:—Ethnos announced that 2,000 people were killed during the first day of the invasion.

A young Greek journalist, Paul Anastasi, carried out an investigation into Ethnos. He published a book in which he alleged that he had uncovered links between the publishers of Ethnos and two important Soviet agents, Boris Pankin, a senior KGB officer, and Vassili Sitnikov, a leading Soviet agent of disinformation operating in Europe. The publishers of Ethnos have sued Paul Anastasi for criminal libel. He has been convicted to a prison sentence which is subject to appeal before the Greek courts. Mr. Anastasi has counter-sued Ethnos. Let us hope that the Western press will watch these cases with interest and concern.

I realize that for a number of people in the audience, the facts that I am describing are commonplace. Their academic, government or journalistic work has made them familiar with these problems. Nonetheless, I hope that they will bear with me while I cover the generalities before reaching a conclusion.

The apparatus in Moscow which is responsible for propaganda is extensive. The leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) regards

propaganda as an indispensable adjunct to Soviet foreign policy and military strategy. Evidence is available which indicates that the investment by the Soviets in propaganda is between \$3 and \$4 billion per annum. In addition to this there are the investments made by those countries which the Soviets use as a secondary instrument in their propaganda effort and more particularly the European satellite countries and Libya and Cuba. There are three major organisations under the Politburo that direct the propaganda apparatus. First, is the International Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) headed by Boris Ponomarev, an alternative member of the Politburo. Second, is the CPSU's International Information Department (IID) headed by Leonid Zamyatin, the former director of the Soviet news agency, Tass. Working alongside the IID is the KGB controlled covert propaganda organisation called Service A which is part of the KGB's First Chief Directorate. Service A plans, coordinates and supports secret operations which are designed to back-up overt Soviet propaganda. Service A supports KGB residencies in every Western Capital in planting rumours, forgeries, agents of influence in the media and government. It is estimated that as many as 15,000 Soviet officials are working in these organisations. In addition, Moscow coordinates similar organisations run by its Eastern European, Cuban and Vietnamese allies. The campaign orchestrated by this apparatus are known by the Soviets as "Active Measures."

An analysis of the principal Soviet front organisations illustrates the breadth of the active measures effort. One of the major organisations is the "World Peace Council" (WPC). It originated in 1949 from the "World Congress of Intellectuals for Peace." The WPC owns a

number of publications which are published in English, French, Spanish and German. Its principal propaganda objective is to encourage the West to disarm. The WPC conducts its operations on a worldwide basis and it has spawned regional and national peace committees.

The "World Federation of Trade Unions" (WFTU) established in 1945 is another Communist front. Its objective is described as the comprehensive support and defence of the world socialist system and it orchestrates campaigns against multi-national companies and in favour of union power. It has been granted Category A status by the United Nations along with UNESCO and the Food and Agricultural Organisation.

The "World Federation of Democratic Youth" (WFDY) and the "International Union of Students" has the task of influencing youth.

The "International Organisation of Journalists" (IOJ) has as an avowed aim the defence "of freedom of the press and journalists". A major activity of the IOJ is the training of journalists in the IOJ's main schools which are located in Budapest, East Berlin, Prague and Sofia and further schools are planned in Havana and Algiers.

The "Christian Peace Conference" (CPC) claims to be a "forum at which Christians from all over the world will meet together and search for God's will concerning current political, social and economic problems."

The "Women's International Democratic Federation" (WIDF) has as avowed goals "to unite women regardless of race, nationality, religion or political opinions so that they may win and defend their rights as citizens, mothers and workers . . ."

You will notice that each of these organisations plays on genuine matters of concern in our society: peace; trade unions; education of the young; freedom of the

press; freedom of worship; women's rights. I mentioned earlier that in the Third World, the Soviets harness genuine revolutionary sentiments so as to guide "wars of national liberation" to Marxist/Leninism. So in the West, they try to harness genuine issues to use them to promote the interests of Marxist/Leninism.

There are a multitude of other major Communist front organisations, such as the "International Association of Democratic Lawyers" (IADL), the "International Radio and Television Organisation" (ORIT), the "World Federation of Scientific Workers" (WFSW) and the "International Federation of Resistance Fighters" (IFRF), etc., etc.

Each of these organisations has sponsored sub-organisations at international, national and local level and publishes magazines, bulletins, etc. Each of these organisations can be shown to be a Communist front with links to Moscow.

As is normal with the Soviet structure, these organisations are supplemented by another layer of front organisations, which pose as independent western charities and institutes.

An example of a Soviet propaganda campaign was the campaign against the neutron warhead. It was part of the Soviet general campaign aimed at preventing NATO from modernising its Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF).

The campaign was lead by the World Peace Council who declared the 6th to 13th August, 1977, as an international "week of action". It then became a coordinated effort of the whole propaganda apparatus including the use of agitprop. The sequence of events was:—

- Peace councils in various East European States held protest meetings.

- In Istanbul, a peace committee demonstrated in front of the U.S. Consulate General.
- In Accra, a group delivered a protest letter to the U.S. Embassy.
- In Stuttgart, Frankfurt and Dusseldorf, front groups organised demonstrations in front of the U.S. Consulate General.
- Similar agitation was carried out by front groups in Lima and Tanzania, as well as a Peruvian protest to the United Nations.
- Other major international fronts such as the "World Federation of Trade Unions" participated in the international week of action.

Also there were the series of Communist-planned conferences in Europe. The target of this effort was the United Nations "Special Session on Disarmament" (SSOD) to be held in New York from 23rd May to 28th June. Three conferences were organised to provide psychological momentum to the SSOD. The World Peace Council, through one of its sub-fronts, the "International Liaison Forum of Peace Forces", organised a symposium from the 6th to 8th February in Vienna on "Nuclear Energy and the Arms Race" in collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency, a United Nations body. A larger meeting was staged in Geneva from 22nd February to 2nd March under the group calling itself the "Special Non-Government Organisations Committee for Disarmament." In fact the real organiser was the World Peace Council aided by the Swiss peace movement. Then there was the "International Forum on the Neutron Bomb" held from the 18th to 20th March in Amsterdam. Sympathisers from all over Europe were brought in for the meeting which culminated on 19th March in a demonstration by some 40,000 people.

There were many other meetings used for the same purpose and organised by the World Peace Council, including one in Mexico City from the 1st to 4th February and another from the 9th to 12th February in Athens.

All this activity was picked up in the Western media. NATO Secretary-General Luns described this Press comment as all consisting of "half truths, untruths and ignorance."

On 8th April 1978 it was announced that President Carter had decided to delay the production and deployment of the neutron warhead.

The chief of the International Department of the Hungarian Communist Party, Janos Bercz, wrote that the "political campaign against the neutron bomb was one of the most significant and successful since World War II."

Another type of propaganda campaign is the type which attempts to discredit an individual.

A good example was the campaign to discredit Franz Josef Strauss. Strauss was a young up and coming Minister in Adenauer's Government. In 1956, aged 41, he was promoted to Minister of Defense. As such he made a major speech in the Bundestag calling for the deployment on German soil of U.S. controlled nuclear weapons so as to counter-balance the growing Soviet threat. The disarming and neutering of Europe had already become a primary Soviet strategy. So Strauss became a prime target.

The campaign, which was intensive and long lasting, followed traditional lines:

- photos, subsequently proven to be fabrications, depicting Strauss in sexually compromising situations, were published in the East European Communist press and distributed to West Germany.

- efforts were made to smear Strauss by linking him to a murder trial, the Praun affair. Praun was a dentist charged with a double murder. A journalist ran a story associating Strauss with the case. Strauss took legal action and won the case.
- efforts were made to impugn Strauss's honesty. In 1962 he was accused by a leftist publication of recommending to the US, for a major development project on U.S. bases in Germany, an apartment designer Lothar Schoss who was connected to the company Finanzbau A.G. (Fibag). It was suggested that Strauss was to share in the Fibag profits. Judicial and Parliamentary investigations followed and both cleared Strauss of misusing influence. Strauss also won a libel action before the Nuremberg courts.
- It was also suggested that Strauss secretly negotiated to buy for \$375,000 cash the Casa Rocca-vispa villa in Switzerland. The real estate agent testified in court that he had been surprised to read the entirely false story but he welcomed the publicity.
- efforts were made to link Strauss with the Lockheed scandal. Compromising documents were circulated and these were subsequently shown to be forgeries.

Strauss was forced to sue for libel on many occasions and won case after case. And there was the Fallex affair. This was Germany's equivalent of the Pentagon Papers. Top secret military information was passed to a major German weekly by a Defence Ministry employee, Colonel Martin. This included details of the NATO evaluation of the military exercise known as Fallex—62.

The article which followed was specific and published such information as: Hamburg would not be defended; the timetable for plans to move NATO aircraft to bases that were not normally used; troop transport timetables; plans for mining Bavarian forests to free US troops there for combat, etc.

Adenauer, in Parliament, called the publication of the article an "abyss of treason". Following a formal complaint of treason, the police raided the offices of the publication at 10 p.m. October 26th 1962 on orders of the Federal Prosecutor. The editor was arrested. But it was Strauss who was punished. He was accused of over-reacting against the press.

He resigned from the Adenauer Government on November 30th. It was subsequently written that "almost everyone concedes that one of the most brilliant post war political careers in West Germany is in ruins" and that some particularly hostile journalists had "expended time, effort, and money, risking jail and credibility with unsubstantiated charges to prevent Strauss from becoming Chancellor and had won".

General Sejna, the high ranking Czech intelligence defector, testified that the campaign to discredit Franz Josef Strauss was orchestrated by the KGB. This does not mean that the publications or journalists involved knowingly participated or realised that their views were being manipulated and used by the Soviets for their purposes.

It is important to understand how such campaigns gather momentum. The overwhelming majority of the journalists who get caught up in such a campaign do not understand the origins or purpose of the campaign. Those responsible for the publications that are used as platforms usually do not realise that they are being used.

The campaigns often begin as a result of a clear policy decision taken by the Soviet propaganda apparatus. The apparatus brings into play all its assets, both overt and covert. You will find that most of the major themes are developed in a coordinated way in that part of the media which is directly controlled by Communist organisations throughout the world, as well as by the Front organisations and the covert network.

As explained by the defectors such as Levchenko, Bittman and others, the covert activities are initiated by general instructions being given to KGB agents of influence. They start by publishing articles reflecting these instructions. The work of the inner core of agents and front organisations then influences a far larger group of sympathetic left leaning journalists. Those are the people described by Lenin as "useful idiots". They do not realise that they are an extension to the Soviet propaganda apparatus and would indignantly and sincerely reject any such suggestion.

Then comes the outer layer consisting of those who follow fashion and seek easy praise.

Responsible journalists can also be disinformed by these campaigns. When a journalist works on an article, he refers to the press cuttings file which covers the subject about which he is writing. Information included in these files, particularly when it originates from responsible publications and has not been corrected, will be used over and over again. So, once the press cuttings files have been polluted by propaganda, the false information will be repeated quite innocently and as it is repeated will gather further credibility and momentum. Responsible journalists go to great lengths to check a statement in cuttings, but inevitably even they can become victims of disinformation.

So, the media faces a major challenge. How can it

defend itself from these campaigns without restricting freedom of expression. Here are some thoughts. We need more information, more disclosure, wider publication of the facts. In other words more and better journalism. The better informed the public, the better equipped it is to be able to distinguish between news and active measures that distort the news. Therefore the media is central to the solution.

I do not have a list of measures which would solve all our problems. Rather I will propose general ideas that need discussion and which concern all propaganda whatever its origins. The implementation of such ideas has both advantages and disadvantages and these need to be assessed. But they all have a common objective—to increase the flow of information so as to enable the media to better inform the public.

1. The Role of the Executive branch of Government

The last thing that we want is any form of Government control, direct or indirect, of the media. That way lies disaster. The Government can have a useful role as a provider of information. In the last years of the Carter Administration, the U.S. government decided to make available details of major Soviet active measures including forgeries, disinformation, etc. The media could then analyse this information and draw its own conclusions. The Reagan administration has continued the practice.

European Governments should do likewise. So far they have failed to find the courage.

Furthermore Governments should set up a system for objective worldwide monitoring of Communist controlled media to identify major propaganda themes and possible agents of influence. The results, without editorial comment, should be made available to the media.

"Journey into Journalism" written by the well known playwright, Arnold Wesker. This is a book about Mr. Wesker's experience in The Sunday Times when he was gathering background material for his play "The Journalists." The Sunday Times attempted to stop its publication. In it Mr. Wesker describes his visit to the Business Section of The Sunday Times and his talks with some of their financial journalists. This is what he says and how he quotes them:—"Far from being pillars of capitalist society they seem to me an army of very bright urban saboteurs." "You see" Mr. Wesker quotes them as saying "it is a question of the credibility of The Sunday Times, which, as an old conservative family newspaper, commands more respect than, say The Observer, which is known for its liberal policies, and therefore we are a better journal through which to infiltrate radical views—more people will believe us."

How do you handle this problem? What disclosures are necessary? The trouble with today's intellectual environment is that few dare discuss the problem. It attracts accusations of McCarthyism. It is taboo. That must be wrong. It is a genuine problem which needs free and open discussion.

4. The Role of Schools of Journalism

Part of the curriculum for training journalists should be a course on propaganda and Active Measures. It should teach how to identify them and how to defend against them. Of course, this should not be restricted to Soviet or far left propaganda. It should cover the whole spectrum. The enactment of your Foreign Agents Registration Act was a reaction against pre-war Nazi propaganda.

5. The Role of Journalists

My whole thesis is that in a free country the best remedy is wide publication of the true facts. According

to the best traditions of the free press, journalists should investigate and publish. But they face a problem. There is a tradition of forbidden areas. Dog must not eat dog. Not only is it unpopular to expose a colleague or a journal but it is also difficult to find papers who would publish your material. Investigation should not be concentrated on the unpopular. It takes no courage to be fashionable, to express conventional wisdom and comfortably to join the pack in attacking the same wounded stag. Courage resides in saying the truth that does not please and which can make you a pariah in the eyes of your peers. That precisely is the duty of the press and one of the great justifications for the freedom of the press.

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PART I

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MILITARY USES OF LASER TECHNOLOGY IN SPACE
THE U.S. STRATEGIC DEFENCE INITIATIVE

DEFENCE

PART I : DECEMBER 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
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FIGURE 21

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SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 October, 1984

Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD): UK Policy
towards the US Strategic Initiative

The Prime Minister has considered the paper on Ballistic Missile Defence sent forward under the joint minute by your Secretary of State and the Foreign Secretary.

The Prime Minister's general view is that the case against the strategic defence initiative is not so open and shut as suggested in the conclusions in paragraph 59 of the paper. In particular, in the light of what the paper says of Soviet research in this area, she feels that the Americans have little option but to push ahead at least to the point where they can be confident that they are matching the Soviet Union.

The Prime Minister would like to discuss this paper soon in a restricted group. We are hoping to arrange this after OD on 22 October.

C. D. POWELL

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

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BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE (BMD): IMPLICATIONS FOR UK POLICY TOWARDS
THE US STRATEGIC DEFENCE INITIATIVE (SDI)

INTERIM REPORT BY OFFICIALS

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BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE (BMD): IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY TOWARDS
THE US STRATEGIC DEFENCE INITIATIVE (SDI)


INTERIM REPORT BY OFFICIALS

A. INTRODUCTION

1. In his "Star Wars" speech of 23 March 1983 President Reagan announced a long-term research and development programme for a system of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) aimed at the "ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles", in order to render them "impotent and obsolete". He emphasised the link between the vital interests of the US and its Allies, and stressed that it would be the intention to destroy missiles before they reached the territory of either. In a message to the Prime Minister, President Reagan denied any US intention of retreating into a Fortress America stance, of violating in any way the 1972 ABM Treaty, departing from commitments to Allies, or seeking a first-strike capability.

2. Work in the US to flesh out the bones of the R&D programme outlined by the President has continued and intensified, under the title of the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). The long-term programme has become a subject of political and technical controversy in the US and, to a lesser extent, in Western Europe and the current state of the debate is set out in Annex A. In summary, public debate within the US has been stimulated first by the publication, this spring, of officially commissioned studies on SDI prospects, and then by criticism of the SDI in the press, in Congress and among US scientists. This has contributed to changes in the Administration's own attitudes, including a move away from the idea of a comprehensive, leakproof defence system towards imperfect defence or defence of specific targets; an increasing emphasis on Soviet activities as a justification for the SDI; and, most recently, an acceptance of the need for dialogue with the Russians. Allied reactions have meanwhile been characterised by increasing concern at the strategic, political, arms control and cost implications of the SDI. This has been reflected in public criticism of the SDI by French and German Ministers, and by the French proposals to limit directed-energy weapons.

Figure 1 Schematic Representation of Multi-layered Ballistic Missile Defence System



COMPARATIVE US AND SOVIET BMD ATTAINMENTS AND CAPABILITIESA THE USAABM

1. The 1972 ABM Treaty allowed both the US and USSR each to deploy up to 100 ABM interceptors either round the national capital or an ICBM field. The Americans chose to defend the ICBMs at Grand Forks, North Dakota and built up an ABM complex there based upon the Safeguard system. This was, however, deactivated on grounds of cost effectiveness, soon after becoming operational in 1975, with the perimeter acquisition radar remaining in use as an early warning system. Research nevertheless continued throughout the 1970s and early 1980s on ABM-related technologies. By early 1983 before the Presidential launching of the SDI, Department of Defence and Department of Energy (DOE) expenditure of \$1.75 billion was already being proposed for FY 1985 in areas such as:

a Infrared (IR) sensors for improved tactical warning of ICBM attack under the USAF's advanced warning system programme.

b Space-based IR sensor developments under the USAF's space-based surveillance system programme.

c The Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)'s Talon Gold programme: a space-based experiment to demonstrate pointing and tracking for space-based DEW concepts.

d Airborne optical system development as part of the US Army's BMD programme.

e The Army's Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE) for homing non-nuclear mid-course interceptors.

f The White Horse neutral particle beam test bed at Los Alamos.

g DARPA's ALPHA programme to demonstrate, initially on the ground, a megawatt-class chemical IR laser.

h DOE analyses of x-ray laser feasibility.

SDI

WORK TO DATE

2. President Reagan's speech of March 1983 led a further impetus to this work, which was brought together in the Integrated Strategic Defence Initiative. Two studies on Strategy and Policy (the Hoffman Report) and Defensive Technologies (the Fletcher Report), were submitted to the President in October 1983. The Defensive Technologies study identified critical technical issues which would have to be resolved before a decision to move to full-scale development could be made. These were:

- a Boost-Phase and Post-Boost-Phase Vehicle Intercept.
(DEWs were identified as the most promising technology for this crucial task and the determination of their lethality against 'responsive' targets, which had been specifically designed to counter them, was given the highest priority of all.)
- b Discrimination and tracking of numerous re-entry vehicles, decoys, and other material during midcourse and high re-entry.
- c Survivability of space-based defensive assets when threatened with nuclear or "mirror-image" weapons.
- d Inexpensive interceptors for non-nuclear midcourse and early re-entry kill.
- e Automated preparation and testing of battle management software.

The study also emphasised that to discourage proliferation of offensive systems as a 'cheap' counter, the cost of destroying a warhead would have to be lower than corresponding offensive

system costs, and that this problem was closely tied to the ability to discriminate between targets and decoys in all phases.

FUTURE WORK AND TIMESCALE

3. The US Government suggests that the implementation of the SDI should be seen in terms of a progressive evolution away from today's sole dependence for deterrence on nuclear retaliation, in the following notional stages, for which the timescales, due to the huge technical uncertainties involved, are necessarily vague:

- a The research phase: The period from the President's March 23 1983 speech to the early 1990s when a decision on whether to enter systems development could be made.
- b The systems development (or full-scale engineering development) phase: assuming a decision to go ahead beginning in the early 1990s when prototypes of actual defensive system components are designed, built, and tested. It would be at this point (early to mid 1990s) that the US would have finally to abrogate the 1972 ABM Treaty (provided it had not already collapsed) if they were to begin testing the new technologies.
- c The transition phase: of incremental, sequential deployment of defensive systems. The US intend that each added increment, in conjunction with effective and survivable offensive systems, should increase deterrence, and reduce the risk of nuclear war. During this period, as the US and USSR deploy defences against ballistic missiles that progressively reduce the value of such missiles, significant reductions in nuclear ballistic missiles might be negotiated and implemented.
- d The final phase: during which deployments of highly effective multi-phased defensive systems are completed and during which ballistic missile force levels reach their negotiated nadir. This is the goal proposed in the President's March 23, 1983 speech, but seems unlikely to be reached before the first decade of the next century, if ever.

B THE SOVIET UNIONCURRENT ABM SYSTEM

4. The ABM treaty permits each side to deploy up to 100 launchers in defence of an ICBM field or the national capital. The Soviet Union currently possesses 16 above-ground launchers and 16 silo launchers as part of the Galosh ABM system around Moscow. Of these only the above-ground launchers are assessed to be operational. The Galosh system, now 20 years old, was designed to counter only simple threats (ie those without penetration aids such as chaff or decoys) and, in response to the development of more sophisticated weapons, the Soviet Union is developing and deploying the High Acceleration Vehicle (HAV) designed to counter missiles well inside the atmosphere. 66 HAV launchers are under construction and preparation is in hand to start another 2. Deployment of the HAV will thus give the Soviet Union a total of 100 HAV and Galosh launchers by 1989 thus giving a limited two-layer defence system around Moscow. These developments remain within the confines of the 1972 ABM Treaty and there is no hard evidence of a Soviet intention to abrogate this Treaty.

OVERALL R & D EFFORT

5. The Soviet Union appears to be following an extensive research and development programme which covers many of the elements required for more advanced multi-layered BMD systems, including possible space-based elements. However, there is no evidence of an intention to deploy an SDI system as such, nor of work on further ground-based BMD using existing technology. But the United States estimates that the Soviet Union is spending in the order of \$1 billion a year on BMD-related directed-energy research alone. In addition, R & D on space continues at a very high level and essential developments such as large space booster and a re-usable orbiter are well advanced. R & D on the systems required to produce a new generation of BMD is, however, in general at such an early stage so highly vulnerable to the development of countermeasures, and so subject to unforeseeable technological development, that it is impossible to predict its outcome.

SPACE-BASED BMD DEVELOPMENTS

6. The Soviet Union has tested three types of laser considered suitable for space-borne BMD i.e. gas dynamic, chemical and iodine lasers. Research programmes exist on megawatt chemical lasers and power systems for electrically-driven gas lasers. Work on an x-ray laser based on the radiation from a nuclear explosion is probably at a much earlier stage. The Soviet Union is well advanced in particle beam research; work on an accelerator began in the 1960s. But while there is some evidence of testing an evaluation of a particle beam weapon concept, there is no indication that the problems of beam steering and control have been solved. The Soviets have also been working for many years on producing the very high powers needed for radiofrequency (RF) weapons, as a natural extension of the development of powerful radars and jamming equipment. There is however only limited knowledge of Soviet progress in this field and the importance they attach to the development of such weapons.

7. The effective use of DEWs as BMD weapons depends on very high accuracy target tracking and precision pointing of the beam. The required accuracy of at least 1 microradian (i.e. within a metre at a range of 1000 kms) is at least 10 times better than the best thought to be achieved by current Soviet ground-based systems. At present the Soviet Union makes use of research in the German Democratic Republic on target tracking in space where the performance achieved is comparable to that in the West. Soviet research has concentrated on laser design and mirror technology (for the beam directing mirror). The pointing and tracking experiments carried out so far in the SALYUT 7 spacecraft are, however, far too crude for the requirements of lasers. Together with the problems of compact power supplies and the miniaturization of command and control systems we believe it will take 20-30 years to produce an operational system, using existing technologies.

8. The Soviet Union has several operational space launch vehicles but none large enough to put a DEW system in space. However new large space boosters are under development with the payload capacity

adequate to support a laser weapon programme. One of these is assessed to have the ability to lift possibly up to 200 tonnes into low Earth orbit. A re-usable manned orbiter similar to the US Shuttle is also under development and should be operational by the late 1980s while a re-usable small space plane has been tested. The large dimensions and mass of space based BMD weapons imply fabrication in space. The Soviet Union has considerable experience from its manned space programme, but a vast amount of additional work would be required to reach a level of expertise adequate for assembling and maintaining space-based BMD.

GROUND-BASED BMD DEVELOPMENTS

9. The Soviets may be working on ground-based lasers for BMD. A project which started in the mid 1960's involves an iodine laser believed to be intended for use against re-entry vehicles in the terminal phase. Trials on the laser are carried out regularly at the weapons development centre at Sary Shagan. Particle Beam Weapons would not be effective as ground-based BMD weapons because of atmospheric absorption.

C. COMPARISON OF US AND SOVIET BMD CAPABILITIES AND POTENTIAL

TECHNICAL PROGRESS

10. It is impossible to be precise about the relative status of the Soviet and United States directed energy weapons programmes because of the wide range of potential weapons, the long lead times associated with the larger systems, the early stages reached in research for space-based BMD applications and, not least, the different approach to the problem taken by the two sides. In broad terms, the Soviet Union appears to be ahead in the development of high-power lasers, with the notable exception of chemical lasers, while the US is more advanced in the development of pointing and tracking and mirror technologies. In space-based systems neither country is advanced beyond R&D, but at this early stage the US has probably progressed further.

C CAPACITY TO AFFORD DEPLOYMENT

11. American ability to afford deployment of a comprehensive BMD system is discussed in Paras 25-30 of the main paper.

12. For the Russians, their BMD R&D programme must already be extremely expensive in both human and financial resources. Two leading research establishments are believed to be involved in the development of space-based lasers and their heavy-lift launch vehicles, both received massive investment during the late 1970's and early 1980's. R&D accounts for 20 per cent of Soviet military expenditure and was increasing at an average annual rate of 5 per cent between 1970 and 1982, making it the fastest growing category of military expenditure; it is not, however, possible to isolate the cost of individual programmes within the overall R&D budget.

13. The Soviet Union is unlikely to allow cost to restrain its development of SDI if it perceives the need to match the US programme. Such a decision would be based on strategic rather than financial considerations and the Russians, by their construction of an unparalleled air defence and ABM system have already proved their willingness to divert very considerable resources to limit the damage which might be inflicted on their homeland, and have consistently demonstrated the ability and willingness to match US developments in other fields.

14. A greater restraint than cost alone is likely to be the demands that a BMD system would place on certain key industries such as electronics where the United States still enjoys a considerable advantage over the Soviet Union. There is no doubt, however, that the Soviet Union is placing great emphasis on advanced technology and in developing its industrial base, particularly in the electronics industry.

15. While the pace and degree of success in these directions will be critical to the development of Soviet BMD, there are already indications that considerable resources are being allocated to space systems development, particularly large launch vehicles and large orbital platforms, and associated infrastructure.

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In parallel with this effort work has begun on development of DEW components. Thus the indications are that technical and industrial resources for a BMD system would be found, although it is unclear what long-term effect the concentration of resources on this area may have on other parts of the defence sector. There is no doubt about the damaging effects that having to devote an even larger slice of the national economy to defence will have but equally no doubt that the leadership would consider this the lesser of the two evils if the choice were between disappointing consumer expectations and keeping up in an arms race in space with the US. Once begun, however, Soviet work on a full-scale counterpart to the American SDI would probably be much less subject to internal political change and turbulence than in the US.

PRESENT AND FUTURE SATELLITE ACTIVITIES IN SPACE

3. CHARACTERISTICS OF ORBITS. In terms of military significance satellite orbits may be grouped into four broad classes, low, high, geostationary and highly elliptical. The lowest practical circular orbital height is about 100 km (though at very low altitudes orbits are shortened by atmospheric friction) and the generally accepted upper limit of low orbits is around 2,000-3,000 km. Low orbits are used primarily for tasks which require the best possible resolution or angular discrimination from a sensor system. They are thus associated with satellites providing surveillance, reconnaissance, meteorological and oceanographic information. In the large tract of space between low and high orbit occur the Van Allen radiation belts which inhibit placement of satellites. The lower limit of high earth orbit is accepted as around 20,000 km with the upper limit at the transition to geostationary orbit at 36,000 km. High orbits have relatively few exclusively military applications. Their main use is in the coming generation of navigation systems which have dual military and civil functions. Geostationary orbits, in which the satellite remains stationary over a fixed equatorial point, are particularly well suited to communications requirements and certain forms of surveillance. Highly elliptical orbits are employed for tasks not readily achievable from circular orbit, for example launch detection, abnormally low photo reconnaissance and communications at high latitudes. Elliptical orbits result in the satellite alternately dwelling over one hemisphere for long periods at high altitude, and skimming fast and low over the other hemisphere. For the purposes of this paper low orbit satellites are described as "low altitude" and all others as "high altitude".

SOVIET SATELLITE CAPABILITY

4. GENERAL. The large investment in the Soviet space programme, the number of satellites launched each year and the wide ranging scope of their functions all indicate that space is important to them, and this is supported by their writings. The scale of investment in space systems by the USSR is thought to exceed that of the rest of the world combined and has risen very steeply since